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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case presents the consolidated challenges by 
Nordhoff Investments and the Official Committee of Equity 
Holders to the District Court's order appr oving the 
Bankruptcy Court's order confirming Zenith's bankruptcy 
and restructuring plan. Zenith argues, as it did below, that 
the challenges posed to its restructuring plan are "equitably 
moot" because the plan has already been substantially 
consummated, has been relied upon by various parties, and 
would be very difficult to retract. The District Court 
thoroughly reviewed all of the relevant considerations and 
found the challenges equitably moot. We accept the lower 
court's findings of fact "unless they ar e completely devoid of 
a credible evidentiary basis or bear no rational relationship 
to the supporting data," Moody v. Security Pacific Bus. 
Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Furthermore, "[b]ecause the mootness determination we 
review here involves a discretionary balancing of equitable 
and prudential factors rather than the limits of the federal 
court's authority under Article III, using or dinary review 
principles we review that decision generally for abuse of 
discretion." In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also In r e PWS Holding, 228 F.3d 
224, 235-36 (3d Cir 2000). We find no such abuse of 
discretion and therefore will affir m. 
 
I. Background 
 
Zenith has suffered critical losses over the past twelve 
years. LG Electronics invested $360 million in Zenith 
during that difficult period, increasing its holdings from five 
percent to fifty-eight percent and occupying six of the 
eleven seats on Zenith's Board of Directors by 1997. Zenith 
attempted to find an outside investor willing to purchase its 
business, but no buyers came forward after Zenith's CEO 
personally met with executives from Micr osoft, Intel, 
General Instruments, and other leaders in the electr onics 
industry. 
 
Zenith continued to suffer losses and LGE pr oposed a 
major restructuring of Zenith's debt and equity in April of 
1998. A special committee of Zenith's Board of Directors 
negotiated with LGE and agreed to a plan. After forming 
their own advisory committee and obtaining counsel from 
legal and financial advisors, the bondholders also agreed to 
the plan. The plan included: 1) exchanging appr oximately 
$103 million in bonds bearing interest at 6.25 percent for 
$50 million in new bonds bearing interest at 8.19 percent; 
2) canceling Zenith's stock for no consideration; 3) issuing 
new Zenith stock to LGE in exchange for $200 million of 
debt relief forgiving debt owed to LGE; 4) LGE extending a 
new $60 million credit facility to Zenith; 5) canceling 
approximately $175 million in additional debt owed to LGE 
in exchange for $135 million of new debt and ownership of 
the Zenith television plant in Reynosa, Mexico; 6) 
refinancing of debt owed to a consortium of banks led by 
Citicorp; 7) no alteration of debt owed to trade cr editors; 
and 8) releasing LGE, Zenith directors and officers, and the 
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Bondholder's Committee from potential liability to Zenith or 
certain creditors. 
 
Zenith submitted the plan to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The SEC reviewed the plan for 
twelve months and eventually declared it ef fective. Despite 
the reduced face value of their claim, the bondholders 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of the plan. LGE and secured 
lenders, including Citibank, also approved the plan. Zenith 
met often with the Equity Committee during this time and 
provided the Committee with all of the infor mation that it 
requested. Zenith then filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition and sought final court approval. 
 
The plan was submitted to a Bankruptcy Court in the 
District of Delaware. Nordhoff, a significant minority 
shareholder in Zenith, and the Equity Committee, which 
represented the interests of the other minority 
shareholders, both opposed the plan and wer e represented 
by counsel at the two-day proceedings. Over Nor dhoff and 
the Equity Committee's objections, the Bankruptcy Court 
approved Zenith's request for an expedited hearing. The 
primary point of contention concerned competing 
valuations of Zenith. Peter J. Solomon, Co. valued Zenith at 
$300 million. That valuation was corroborated by the fact 
that Zenith had been unable to sell at a related price, the 
bondholders' agreement to reduce their claims, and other 
relevant valuations. Ernst and Young, appearing on behalf 
of the Equity Committee, valued Zenith at $1.05 billion, 
which was based on a discount rate the "same as 
Microsoft's" and a higher royalty rate than calculated by 
Solomon. Nordhoff and the Equity Committee attempted to 
discredit Solomon by presenting evidence that Solomon had 
a conflict of interest based upon its pr evious relations with 
Zenith and would receive a $1 million awar d if Zenith's 
plan was successful. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court ultimately accepted Solomon's 
valuation over Ernst and Young's and decided that: 1) 
"Zenith's Plan [was] proposed in good faith under the 
general requirements of the bankruptcy code"; 2) the plan 
was entirely fair; 3) LGE had acted appr opriately; 4) 
Zenith's disclosure statement contained a wealth of 
information, the plan was approved by SEC, and it 
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complied with nonbankruptcy law and the Bankruptcy 
Code; 5) the "shareholders are r eceiving the value of their 
interests under the plan--nothing"; 6) Solomon's valuation 
was not tainted; and 7) this "reorganization is exactly what 
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was designed to 
accomplish." 
 
The Bankruptcy Court conditionally confirmed the plan 
and rejected Nordhoff and the Equity Committee's 
objections on November 2, 1999. The Bankruptcy Court 
permitted the release of all claims by Zenith, but refused to 
allow the release of claims by creditors who did not vote in 
favor of the plan. The Court therefore r equired Zenith to 
delete any release by claimants who had not affirmatively 
accepted the plan. The Court granted Zenith ten days to 
make these modifications. 
 
Nordhoff and the Equity Committee r eceived the 
Bankruptcy Court's opinion on November 3. Zenith 
immediately made the required changes and submitted the 
amended plan to the Court on November 4. Zenith served 
the Equity Committee with the amended plan on November 
4, but, because of what they testified was an"oversight," 
Zenith officials did not serve Nordhof f with the amended 
plan at this time. The Court signed the amended 
confirmation order on November 5, but did not immediately 
notify the parties. Nonetheless, Zenith lear ned that the 
order had been signed via the Court's public web cite on 
November 5. On November 9, Zenith officials faxed a letter 
to Nordhoff and the Equity Committee stating that they 
"understand that the court signed the confir mation order 
on November 5." Zenith received a signed copy of the 
confirmation on November 10 and faxed copies of the 
amended plan and the Court's confirmation or der to 
Nordhoff and the Equity Committee the same day. Nordhoff 
and the Equity Committee filed notices of appeal to the 
Bankruptcy Court on November 12. At no point, however, 
did either Nordhoff or the Equity Committee seek to stay 
the plan. 
 
Both the proposed and final plan called for"Immediate 
Effectiveness," and it was clear thr oughout the proceeding 
that Zenith intended to implement the plan immediately 
upon approval. As a result, much of the plan was executed 
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between November 5, when the Court confirmed, and 
November 10, when Nordhoff was first officially notified. 
The following transactions were completed by November 9: 
1) Zenith replaced its debtor-in-possession credit facility 
with a new $150 million facility syndicated by Citicorp; 2) 
Zenith entered into a new $60 million cr edit facility with 
LGE; 3) Zenith canceled old stock and issued new stock to 
LGE; and 4) Zenith canceled certain debt owed to LGE, 
issued new debt to LGE, and canceled some of the new 
debt in exchange for the transfer of the Reynosa plant at a 
later date. Zenith's bondholders, however, did not begin to 
tender their $103.5 million in old bonds for $50 million in 
new publicly traded instruments until November 19, 1999. 
Nearly all of the bonds were exchanged by January 3, 2000, 
and they have been subject to public trading ever since. If 
bondholders did not own a sufficient amount of debt to 
receive a new bond, their holdings were aggregated and 
sold on the open market. The cash proceeds wer e then 
allocated to the fractional holders. Zenith management has 
since been replaced by LGE management, and the Zenith 
executives who devised the plan have departed. 
 
Nordhoff and the Equity Committee appealed to the 
District Court, challenging the valuation of their shares, the 
reliance on Solomon's valuation, the expedition of the 
proceedings, the lack of evidentiary recor d, and the plan 
provisions releasing LGE and Zenith's dir ectors from 
potential liability. The District Court dismissed the appeal 
as equitably moot. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
At least one Bankruptcy Court has characterized 
"equitable mootness" as a misnomer: "Ther e is nothing 
equitable about the equitable mootness doctrine. . .. The 
matter is moot out of necessity, not application of equitable 
principles. In a very real sense the doctrine is more 
accurately denominated as `prudential mootness.' " In re 
Box Brother Holding Corp., 194 B.R. 32, 45 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1996); see also PWS Holding, 228 F.3d at 235-36 (stating 
that "the use of the word `mootness' as a shortcut for a 
court's decision that the fait accompli of a plan 
confirmation should preclude further judicial proceedings 
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has led to the unfortunate confusion between equitable 
mootness and constitutional mootness"). W e do not entirely 
agree. One inequity, in particular, that is often at issue is 
the effect upon innocent third parties. When transactions 
following court orders are unraveled, thir d parties not 
before us who purchased securities in r eliance on those 
orders will likely suffer adverse ef fects. 
 
We developed the equitable mootness doctrine in In re 
Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553 (3d Cir . 1996) (en banc). 
Continental Airlines involved a complex Chapter 11 
reorganization premised upon a $450 million investment by 
two outside parties. Trustees of creditors challenged the 
plan due to the decline in value of the aircraft and jet 
engines securing their investment. This challenge 
jeopardized the plan because the investors had conditioned 
their involvement upon the absence of such liability. The 
Bankruptcy Court rejected the trustees' claim. The trustees 
sought a stay, were denied, and appealed to the District 
Court. Meanwhile, relying on the Bankruptcy Court's 
confirmation, the investors committed their capital and 
consummated the plan. Continental then moved to dismiss 
the trustees' appeal on grounds of equitable mootness. The 
District Court granted the motion and dismissed the 
appeal. We affirmed, stating that such "an appeal should 
. . . be dismissed as moot when, even though ef fective relief 
could conceivably be fashioned, implementation of that 
relief would be inequitable." Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d at 
559 (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d 
Cir. 1993)). 
 
We held that five factors had to be considered when 
conducting an equitable mootness analysis: 
 
       (1) whether the reorganization plan has been 
       substantially consummated, 
 
       (2) whether a stay has been obtained, 
 
       (3) whether the relief requested would af fect the rights 
       of the parties not before the court, 
 
       (4) whether the relief requested would af fect the 
       success of the plan, and 
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       (5) the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy 
       judgments. 
 
Id. at 560. As we stated in PWS Holding , these "factors are 
given varying weight, depending on the particular 
circumstances, but the foremost consideration is whether 
the reorganization plan has been substantially 
consummated." 228 F.3d at 236. In ef fect, the equitable 
mootness doctrine prevents a court from unscrambling 
complex bankruptcy reorganizations when the appealing 
party should have acted before the plan became extremely 
difficult to retract. We have noted, however, that the 
"doctrine is limited in scope and should be cautiously 
applied . . . ." PWS Holding, 228 F .3d at 236. 
 
We now consider the elements of the equitable mootness 
doctrine against these facts. 
 
A. Substantial Consummation of the Plan 
 
As we stated in Continental Airlines, the substantial 
consummation factor is the "foremost consideration" in an 
equitable mootness analysis, especially when the plan 
"involves intricate transactions . . . or wher e investors have 
relied on the confirmations of the plan." 91 F.3d at 560. 
The Bankruptcy Code defines "substantial consummation" 
to mean: 
 
       (A) transfer of all or substantially all of the pr operty 
       proposed by the plan to be transferred; 
 
       (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the 
       debtor under the plan of the business or of the 
       management of all or substantially all of the pr operty 
       dealt with by the plan; and 
 
       (C) commencement of distribution under the plan. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1101(2). 
 
Appellants concede that the plan has been substantially 
consummated. The Confirmation Order stated that the plan 
would be immediately effective, and many of the key 
transactions were completed by November 9, 1999. On 
November 19, Zenith began exchanging bonds in 
accordance with the plan, and by January 2000, the only 
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portion of the plan remaining to be consummated was the 
exchange of one percent of the bonds. By that time, all 
property had been transferred, all managerial changes had 
occurred, and virtually all of the distributions had been 
made. As the District Court concluded, there can be little 
question that the plan has been substantially 
consummated. 
 
Appellants claim, however, that the plan was 
"remarkable" for how little it actually accomplished and 
that it could be easily retracted. Since it did not contain 
intricate transactions, Appellants claim, the plan could be 
reversed in a manner equitable to all parties. Appellants 
argue that although the plan involved debt and asset 
evaluation of large sums, mere quantities do not rise to the 
level of complexity found in Continental Airlines. Further, 
Appellants claim that Zenith could have conducted the plan 
under state law and without the approval of the 
Bankruptcy Court. The only reason Zenith utilized 
bankruptcy law, Appellants argue, was to eliminate 
minority shareholders' rights and expedite the process. 
Because the plan was simple and could be so easily 
reversed, Appellants argue that it is appropriate for us to 
reconsider the valuation question befor e the Bankruptcy 
Court. If the Bankruptcy Court's valuation findings were 
reversed, then a new trial could be conducted to determine 
if LGE paid a fair price. 
 
The District Court found Appellant's arguments"not 
completely without merit." Compared to the plan in 
Continental Airlines, which entailed numer ous irrevocable 
transactions, the merging of fifty-thr ee debtors, the 
investment of $110 million in cash by two outside 
investors, and the transfer of trade routes by foreign 
governments, the plan here is relatively simple. The District 
Court recognized that the assembly plant could be 
transferred back to Zenith, the exchange of debt for stock 
could be reversed, and that since Citicorp had been the 
major debtor to Zenith before, during, and after the 
transaction its refinancing could be r eversed without great 
difficulty. The District Court found the exchange of bonds, 
however, to present "a more difficult problem." Since the 
bonds are publicly traded, the District Court speculated 
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that "they may have been sold, perhaps mor e than once," 
and it would therefore be difficult, if not impossible, to 
reverse the exchange. Further, "any such reversal would 
almost certainly impact the rights of investors that were not 
involved in the bankruptcy court proceedings." While 
potentially difficult, the District Court nonetheless reasoned 
that "the reversal of these transactions would not likely be 
quite as daunting a task as the unmerging of 54 debtors 
and the return of the outside investors' investments" as 
would have been required in Continental Airlines. The 
District Court concluded that 
 
       although some of the Plan transactions could 
       conceivably be "reversed," this would not be easy to 
       accomplish, and other transactions may not be 
       reversible at all. This factor, ther efore, weighs heavily 
       in favor of dismissal, at least to the extent that the 
       court could not fashion relief that would not r esult in 
       the dismantling of the plan. 
 
We have no reason to find that the District Court abused 
its discretion in making this determination. The Court 
considered each of Appellants' arguments and prudentially 
balanced the concerns. Although the plan her e is not as 
complex as the plan in Continental Airlines, it is hardly 
simple. The plan required eighteen months of negotiation 
between several parties regarding hundr eds of millions of 
dollars, restructured the debt, assets, and management of 
a major corporation, and successfully rejuvenated Zenith. 
Appellants have not offered any evidence that the plan 
could be reversed without great difficulty and inequity, and 
we have reason to believe that the bond r edistribution is 
unretractable. See In re UNR, 20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 1994); 
In re Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshir e, 963 F.2d 469 (1st 
Cir. 1992). The District Court, therefor e, did not abuse its 
discretion in its analysis of this factor of the equitable 
mootness test. 
 
B. The Failure to Obtain a Stay 
 
Because of the nature of bankruptcy confir mations, we 
have held that it "is obligatory upon appellant .. . to 
pursue with diligence all available remedies to obtain a stay 
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of execution of the objectionable order (even to the extent of 
applying to the Circuit Justice for relief. . . ), if the failure 
to do so creates a situation rendering it inequitable to 
reverse the orders appealed from." In re Highway Truck 
Drivers & Helpers Local Union #107, 888 F .2d 293, 297 (3d 
Cir. 1989); see also Continental Airlines , 91 F.3d at 566 
("There was a clear possibility the [Appellants'] claims 
would become moot after consummation of the plan, and it 
was therefore incumbent on the [Appellants] to obtain a 
stay."); In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d at 326 ("[T]he 
party who appeals without seeking to avail himself of that 
[stay] protection does so at his own risk."); In re Crystal Oil 
Co., 854 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding a claim 
inequitable because the Appellant made no ef fort to obtain 
a stay); In re Roberts Farms, Inc. , 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (dismissing an appeal for lack of equity because 
the Appellant never applied to the bankruptcy court for a 
stay); In re Grand Union Co. v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, 
200 B.R. 101, 105 (Bankr. D. Del 1996). Appellants did not, 
at any time, seek a stay. As the District Court determined, 
this weighs heavily in favor of dismissing Appellants' 
claims. 
 
Appellants argue that because Zenith did not provide a 
copy of the revised plan on November 4, and since much of 
the plan was consummated by the time they received notice 
on November 9, it was futile for them to seek a stay in an 
attempt to prevent the plan from being substantially 
consummated. The record does reflect that Zenith learned 
on November 5 that the revised plan had been confirmed 
but did not directly relay this infor mation until November 
9, at which time much of the plan had been consummated. 
Zenith surely realized that the minority shareholders, 
whose shares were nullified without consideration, would 
oppose the confirmation order. The District Court, 
therefore, correctly characterized this "oversight" as 
"suspicious." 
 
As the District Court correctly reasoned, however, this 
oversight did not foreclose Appellants fr om seeking a stay. 
First, although Zenith did not immediately pr ovide notice to 
Nordhoff, it did provide immediate notice to the Equity 
Committee. Nordhoff was, at all times, a member of the 
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Equity Committee, and therefore Appellants had an 
opportunity to bring a timely request for a stay before the 
plan was consummated. Second, Appellants wer e well 
aware that the plan was about to be confir med. All relevant 
versions of the plan called for "Immediate Ef fectiveness," 
and the Bankruptcy Court conditioned its confir mation 
upon only minor modifications. Confirmation was pending, 
the Equity Committee was immediately notified when the 
modified plan was approved, and the confir mation was 
publically posted on November 5 on the Bankruptcy Court's 
web site. If Appellants intended to seek a stay, these 
circumstances afforded them the opportunity to do so 
immediately upon the approval of the plan. Thir d, and most 
importantly, both sets of Appellants were, by all accounts, 
notified by November 9. The bond exchanging, the most 
complex and irreversible element of the plan, did not begin 
until November 19. Appellants have not offer ed any 
justification for not seeking a stay between November 9 and 
November 19. "Therefore," the District Court concluded, 
"while the circumstances surrounding the appellant's 
failure to obtain or even seek a stay suggests that this 
factor should receive somewhat less weight than it 
ordinarily would, it does still weigh in favor of a finding of 
equitable mootness." 
 
The District Court properly weighed the competing 
considerations and therefore its deter mination that the 
failure to obtain a stay weighed in favor of dismissing 
Appellants' claims was within its discretion. 
 
C. Reliance on Confirmation by Parties not 
Before the Court 
 
In addition to the first two elements of the doctrine of 
equitable mootness, we stated in Continental Airlines that 
"[h]igh on the list of prudential considerations taken into 
account by courts considering whether to allow an appeal 
following a consummated reorganization is the reliance by 
third parties, in particular investors, on thefinality of the 
transaction." 91 F.3d at 562. As we further explained, the 
"concept of mootness from a prudential standpoint protects 
the interests of non-adverse third parties who are not 
before the reviewing court but who have acted in reliance 
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on the plan as implemented." Id. (citing Manges v. Seattle- 
First Nat'l Bank, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 
The District Court considered the status of six parties 
who Zenith alleged would have their interests undermined 
by reversal of the confirmation or der: 1) the consortium of 
lenders headed by Citicorp; 2) Zenith's bondholders; 3) 
Zenith's retailers and distributors; 4) Zenith's vendors, 
suppliers, and service providers; 5) LGE; and 6) Zenith's 
former minority shareholders. The District Court found that 
"none [of these parties] appear to merit the same `outside 
investor' status as the investors in Continental ," who 
committed $450 million. To varying degr ees, however, the 
District Court found that some of these parties merit 
protection. 
 
First, because Citicorp was a secured lender before, 
during, and after the confirmation, it would not suffer an 
adverse impact as a result of appellate r eview. Also, the 
lenders voted in favor of the plan and were r epresented by 
counsel at the proceedings below. Thus, the District Court 
found that Citicorp's $40 million advance on a $150 million 
credit facility at least raised questions as to whether they 
should be viewed as "third parties not befor e the court." 
Second, the District Court found that the inter ests of the 
bondholders were "perhaps mor e strongly implicated." 
Although the bondholders were not true outside parties "in 
the sense that they could walk away from the deal," the 
"bonds are publicly traded and the bondholders today may 
not be the same investors as the bondholders at the time of 
the bankruptcy filing or confirmation." Therefore, the 
District Court reasoned: 
 
       Many sales of those bonds may have occurred in the 
       reliance on the creditworthiness of the r eorganized 
       debtor. Whether these reliance inter ests will be 
       impaired depends upon the impact of appellate r eview 
       on that creditworthiness. It would seem that the 
       bondholders would likely be harmed only if r eversal of 
       the confirmation order leads to the withdrawal of LGE's 
       support . . . 
 
We agree that the bondholders maintain a third party 
interest. Third, the District Court found Zenith's claims 
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regarding the retailers, distributors, and suppliers 
"somewhat thin." Apparently, these parties entered into 
commitments with Zenith in reliance on thefinality of the 
reorganization and allocated shelf space, production 
capacity, and credit according to the confirmation, and the 
District Court found that "[a]t least some of these unnamed 
entities are likely to be `third parties' entitled to 
consideration under the equitable mootness analysis." The 
Court found the "potential harm to these parties, however," 
to be "somewhat speculative." Fourth, the District Court 
found Zenith's attempt to characterize LGE as an outside 
party "unpersuasive" since it was the majority shareholder 
prior to bankruptcy and is now the sole shar eholder. Unlike 
the outside investors in Continental Airlines , LGE would 
have incurred massive losses had it walked away from the 
deal. Fifth, the Court found Zenith's claims that the 
minority shareholders may have taken tax deductions 
based on their losses without merit since Zenith did not 
produce any evidence that these former shareholders would 
prefer to take the tax deduction instead of r ecovering their 
previous stock holding. 
 
The District Court concluded that there "ar e third parties 
who have likely relied on confirmation of the plan and who 
could be harmed by reversal of the confirmation order." 
"Although these parties may not be properly characterized 
as `outside investors,' " the Court stated,"such investors 
are not the only types of third parties given considerations 
in an equitable mootness analysis." "Ther efore," the Court 
concluded, "while this factor may not warrant quite as 
much weight as it did in Continental, it does still weigh in 
favor of a finding of equitable mootness." 
 
Nordhoff also challenges the District Court on this issue 
by claiming that all of the third parties, with the exception 
of the retailers and suppliers, were befor e the Bankruptcy 
Court and therefore are not, as Continental Airlines 
required, "non-adverse third parties who are not before the 
reviewing court." As Zenith points out, however, the 
requirement calls for parties to be befor e the reviewing 
court, and while some of these parties may have been for 
the Bankruptcy Court, they are not befor e us now. See In 
Re Box Brothers, 194 B.R. at 42. Since these parties are not 
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currently before us and relied on the plan confirmation, 
they merit protection under the equitable mootness 
doctrine. 
 
Although these facts do not present the same extent of 
reliance as found in Continental Airlines , this concern still 
weighs against Appellants' challenges. The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in its deter mination that "non- 
adverse third parties who are not befor e the reviewing 
court" relied on the confirmation and therefore merit some 
protection. 
 
D. Whether the Relief Requested Would Af fect 
the Success of the Plan 
 
We also consider whether Appellants' concer ns could be 
remedied without unraveling the entirety of the plan or 
whether they seek to "knock the props out fr om under the 
authorization for every transaction that has taken place 
and create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for 
the Bankruptcy Court." In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d at 
952; see also In Re Robert Farms, 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
 
Appellants challenge the valuation of Zenith, and this 
price is the very centerpiece of the plan. As the District 
Court noted, the agreed-upon valuation per mitted: 1) LGE's 
emergence as the sole shareholder with no consideration 
paid to the minority shareholders, and 2) the bondholders' 
acceptance of new bonds worth roughly one half the value 
of the old bonds. The plan would no longer be viable 
without these agreements, and the futur e relationship 
between LGE and Zenith would be cast in doubt. W ithout 
LGE, Zenith would likely be forced to liquidate under 
Chapter 7 since their recent recovery is contingent upon 
the plan. Thus, Appellants do not challenge an 
"intermediate" element of the plan that could be altered 
while maintaining the overall integrity of the plan, as in 
PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224. 
 
Appellants explicitly indicated during oral ar gument that 
it was their intention to dissolve the plan: "This is one of 
[those plans] where the plan can and should be unravel'ed. 
Okay? I do want to make that clear. Again, if it was vague 
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from my papers, let me make it absolutely clear ." 
Appellants seek "nothing less than a wholesale annihilation 
of the Plan," In re Manges, 29 F .3d at 1043, and this 
proposed relief would affect the r e-emergence of the debtor 
as a revitalized entity." See In r e Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 
1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1992). The District Court thus 
properly found that this element of the equitable mootness 
doctrine weighs against Appellants. 
 
E. General Public Policy Affording Finality 
to Bankruptcy Judgments 
 
As the District Court stated, "the public policy of 
affording finality to bankruptcy judgments is better 
described as the lens through which the other equitable 
mootness factors should be viewed." We described this 
rationale in Continental Airlines: 
 
       Our inquiry should not be about the "reasonableness" 
       of the Investors' reliance or the probability of either 
       party succeeding on appeal. Rather, we should ask 
       whether we want to encourage or discourage r eliance of 
       investors and others on the finality of bankruptcy 
       confirmation orders. The strong public policy in favor 
       of maximizing debtor's estates and facilitating 
       successful reorganization, reflected in the code itself, 
       clearly weighs in favor of encouraging such r eliance. 
       Indeed, the importance of allowing approved 
       reorganizations to go forward in r eliance on bankruptcy 
       court confirmation orders may be the central 
       animating force behind the equitable mootness 
       doctrine. Where, as here, investors and other third 
       parties consummate a massive reorganization in 
       reliance on an unstayed confirmation or der that, 
       explicitly and as a condition of feasibility, denied the 
       claim for which appellate review is sought, the 
       allowance of such appellate review would likely 
       undermine public confidence in the finality of 
       bankruptcy confirmation orders and make successful 
       completion of large reorganization like this more 
       difficult. 
 
91 F.3d 565 (citations omitted). 
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Here, unlike Continental Airlines, LGE is not an outsider 
but rather had independent financial incentive to facilitate 
Zenith's recovery. It is therefore less necessary to encourage 
LGE's reliance on the bankruptcy judgment in this case. 
However, this plan did enable Zenith to negotiate with 
several parties and recover from its decline. Likewise, a 
number of parties relied on the confir mation of the plan, 
and, as the District Court stated, reversal would be 
contrary to the public policy of encouraging actions, by 
outsiders and investors alike, that facilitates successful 
reorganizations. 
 
The District Court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion 
by determining that the public policy of pr omoting the 
finality of bankruptcy judgements also weighed in favor of 
dismissing Appellants' appeals. 
 
F. Other Considerations 
 
1. Expedition of the Confirmation 
 
Appellants further argue that expediting the plan's 
confirmation was unfair since the Appellants had only one 
month to prepare objections, and this was an insufficient 
amount of time. In addition, Appellants complain that the 
plan was consummated between November 4 and November 
9, which was before Nordhoff knew of the confirmation. 
Despite this final push toward consummation, however, all 
parties were aware of the plan during its eighteen-month 
creation and were allowed to review r elevant documents 
and meet with the plan operatives. "Thus," as the District 
Court stated, "despite expedited proceedings in the 
Bankruptcy Court, Appellants cannot claim to have been 
denied a meaningful opportunity to engage their own 
experts or otherwise oppose the plan." We agree. 
 
2. Solomon's Valuation 
 
Appellants also complain that the Bankruptcy Court 
adopted Solomon's valuation despite conflicts of interest. 
First, courts have broad discretion not only to admit expert 
witnesses, but also to weigh their testimony. Kumho Tire 
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Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999). Second, 
Solomon's valuation was corroborated by the fact that no 
investors had accepted Zenith's offer to sell at a related 
price, the bondholders' agreement to reduce the value of 
their claims, and other relevant valuations. Third, the 
margin of error between Solomon's valuation and Zenith's 
solvency was $400 million. Fourth, the Bankruptcy Court 
determined that Solomon's compensation was not a mere 
"success fee," but rather was for a "substantial array of 
services: investment banking advice, financial analysis, 
operational restructuring, marketing, as well as valuation 
analysis. The `success fee' was not offer ed for its testimony 
at the confirmation hearing." We will not disturb these 
findings. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The District Court gave serious consideration to the 
issues of fundamental fairness that Zenith may have 
abused. "Because the issues implicate the fair ness of the 
process by which the plan was proposed and confirmed," 
the District Court stated, "the court is somewhat reluctant 
to preclude appellate review of those issues." "Although the 
court will dismiss the appeals," it decided,"it does not do 
so without some hesitation." The District Court concluded: 
"Having considered and weighed the factors discussed 
above, the court is convinced that dismissal of these 
appeals on equitable mootness grounds is appr opriate. In 
particular, Appellants' failure to even seek a stay as the 
plan was being substantially - if not entir ely - 
consummated outweighs the courts concerns identified 
above." 
 
The District Court accurately analyzed each of the factors 
of the equitable mootness test, appropriately balanced 
these elements, and concluded that the doctrine should 
apply to Appellants' claims. The District Court ther efore did 
not abuse its discretion and we will affir m. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 
 
I reluctantly concur in the judgment of the court. Under 
In re Continental Airlines, 91 F .3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Bank of N.Y . v. Continental 
Airlines, 519 U.S. 1057 (1997), I am afraid that we must 
affirm the decision of the District Court holding that the 
appeal is equitably moot. The District Court applied the 
standard adopted in Continental Airlines , and although the 
District Court's decision is debatable, it did not commit an 
abuse of discretion. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, I am primarily influenced by 
the appellants' failure to seek a stay. It is disturbing that 
Zenith, in a seeming attempt to moot any appeal prior to 
filing, succeeded in implementing most of the plan before 
the appellants even received notice that the plan had been 
confirmed. However, the plan was not entirely 
consummated when the appellants finally lear ned of the 
bankruptcy court's order. Most notably, the exchange of the 
old for the new bonds had still not been carried out. If the 
appellants had promptly applied for a stay, with or without 
posting a bond, when they finally got word of what the 
bankruptcy court had done, I would view this appeal 
differently. But the appellants never applied for a stay and 
have not provided an adequate explanation for their failure 
to do so. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the 
decision of the district court was an abuse of discr etion. 
 
For the reasons explained in my dissent in Continental 
Airlines, see 91 F.3d at 567-73, however, I continue to 
disagree with the expansive version of the equitable 
mootness doctrine that our court adopted in that case, as 
well as with the abuse-of-discretion standar d of review. See 
id. at 568 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting). As this case shows, our 
court's equitable mootness doctrine can easily be used as a 
weapon to prevent any appellate review of bankruptcy court 
orders confirming reorganization plans. It thus places far 
too much power in the hands of bankruptcy judges. 
 
A True Copy: 
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